Author: Tika Gobadze
In February 2022, a few days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the “Unlimited Partnership” agreement signed between China and Russia especially deepened the relationship between the two countries. In addition to the economic significance, which, among other benefits, allows Russia to replace the European market, the agreement is also politically important – Russia and China present their union as an alternative to the West and talk about the existence of a multipolar world in which the influence of the West will be significantly weakened.
Despite such a partnership, there are still questions about how long-term the friendship between the two countries is – beyond the frequency of intersection of interests, there are specific regions where it is of particular importance for each of them to spread their own influence and establish regional hegemony.
One of the most visible examples of this is Central Asia. Central Asia is characterized as the most important pillar for Russia, which has been considered the most stable region in terms of partnership for years. However, the events that developed after the war in Ukraine showed that its influence is not as strong as perceived before. For example, because Kazakhstan did not openly express its support for Russia in the war in Ukraine, in 2022, Russia stopped the operation of the Caspian Consortium marine terminal, which was the main way for Kazakhstan to export oil. Despite this, instead of making concessions, the Kazakh government started looking for alternative ways. By 2023, Russia had to restore the functioning of the consortium and reopen the export route for Kazakhstan.
Along with the gradual reduction of Russia’s influence, China is establishing itself as the most important ally for each country in Central Asia – according to official statistics, China is the main trading partner for all five Central Asian countries. In addition, the countries of Central Asia play a major role in China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” and within this framework, more than 100 projects are financed by China in the region. In addition, China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” is important, in which Central Asian countries play a major role and within the framework of which more than 100 projects are financed by China in the region. It should be noted that such strengthening of positions by China was not so alarming for Russia as it would be in the case of any other country. China was able to act according to its interests in the region without “irritating” Russia, which largely stems from the fact that these interests, at first glance, are only to constrain the West and develop economically. The existence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) also played a big role in the forming of such attitudes by Russia. SCO allowed China to deepen its economic and energy ties with Central Asia while recognizing Russia as a key political actor and guarantor of security in the region. In addition, of course, the nature of the relations between Russia and China itself is an important factor. “Unlimited partnership” has not only brought positive results for Russia. Despite the fact that China is the lifeblood of the Russian economy, such a distribution of forces has created an undesirable situation for Russia: the increase in China’s role as a trading partner has made Russia an unequal partner and given China leverage against it.
Despite the above, Russia is starting a kind of “awakening”. In May 2023, a summit was held with the participation of China and Central Asian countries, which was the first time that China met the five countries without Russia. Such a move by the countries is an indication that the SCO is losing relevance, and China is starting to establish ties with the C5 independently of Russia, while Russia is addressing the governments of the Central Asian countries with more and more aggressive language.
Central Asian countries, despite their past loyalty, are gradually losing interest in Russia as a partner country. This is preceded by both Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s inability to fulfill security guarantees at specific moments. The example of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is also an important factor: in 2022, there were several confrontations between the two countries due to the issue of border demarcation, although despite having military bases in both countries, Russia did not play a significant role in the conflict. In addition, the soldiers of the Russian base in Tajikistan were often involved in the fight against Ukraine and could not participate in the ongoing clashes in Central Asia. participation. This fact was followed by a statement made by the president of Tajikistan, by which he called on Russia to show more respect to Central Asia. calls. Later, Tajikistan refused to join the CSTO, further deepening the existing distance between it and Russia. Such actions are a demonstration of the fact that Russia is gradually losing its power even in the spheres of its greatest influence.
Tajikistan, despite its economic weakness (Tajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia by gross national income per capita), is of strategic importance for China’s security. Tajikistan borders Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and the Wakhan Corridor, thus playing a special role in the security of China’s western border. In 2016, China established a cooperation and coordination mechanism between Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, conducted counter-terrorism training in Tajikistan, and there is a possibility that some of its soldiers are stationed in the Badakhshan province of Tajikistan, where, according to China, Fighters allied with terrorist organizations have been spotted. Additionally, China claims that the Taliban have moved Uyghur fighters into the Wakhan Corridor near the Chinese border, deploying its own troops along the Tajik-Afghan border along with troops from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and other countries.
The importance of Tajikistan for China is also great in the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). Given that China’s interests include expanding the BRI south to the Indian Ocean, it needs Afghanistan’s involvement in the project. Despite the Taliban’s willingness to join the BRI, China still needs additional security guarantees. Due to the fact that a large part of the population of Afghanistan is of ethnic Tajik origin, they have a great influence on the northern part of the country. Despite the uncertainty of relations between them and Tajikistan, China still has reason to bet on influence in Tajikistan – perhaps the ethnic connection will make a significant contribution to the negotiations between China and Afghanistan through Tajikistan.
China’s similar interests and growing influence show that it is trying to distance Russia from the region. In the development of such a scenario, Central Asian countries, especially Tajikistan, will become economically dependent on China. Considering the poverty of Tajikistan and the amount of its debt (about 60% of Tajikistan’s external debt, 2 billion US dollars, is taken from China), it is easy to imagine how big a political risk such a reality is for Tajikistan. It must be noted that Tajikistan had to hand over more than 1100 square kilometers of territory to China in 2011 due to its inability to repay China’s debt.
Considering the amount of debt, there is a great possibility that such a trend will grow to a larger scale, and the country will have to gradually give up its sovereignty due to economic weakness. China’s taking similar positions in Tajikistan would allow it to control border security, launch attacks on Uyghurs, etc.
It is vital for Tajikistan to prevent such a scenario, which it can only do with fundamental changes in its economic strategies. Tajikistan needs to find new partners and deepen existing ties to avoid China’s unequivocal hegemony and balance its economic importance with relations with other countries. Such a country could be India, which also has an interest in Tajikistan’s location, more specifically, its proximity to Pakistan, and has attempted to build military bases on Tajikistan’s territory. New relations with India would allow Tajikistan to diversify economically and forge important new political partnerships.
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